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Review: The Essence of Property Law
FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW, 3d Edition.

By Edward H. Rabin and Roberta Rosenthal Kwall. New York,
New York: Foundation Press, 1992. Pp. xvi, 1092.
Reviewed by Vada Waters Lindsey*

I.

INTRODUCTION

I have taught property law for four years and, after considering
other casebooks, I have always used Rabin and Kwall's Fundamentals
of Modern Real Property Law.1 My initial reason for selecting this
casebook had much to do with my comfort level in contacting
Professor Kwall to discuss her use of the casebook and course content.
She graciously supplied me with several syllabi she had used throughout the years and helped alleviate the anxiety that accompanies new
class preparation. In addition, I found Rabin and Kwall's Teacher's
Manual to be a useful tool because of its level of detail, including a
reference list to scholarly articles analyzing every subject covered in the
casebook.
When my former Academic Dean asked me to consider teaching
Property Law, I agreed to teach the course without hesitation. I was
extremely excited to teach a course in property law-not because I
would gain a strong understanding of the archaic rule against perpetuities, but because of my desire to help the students establish a strong
foundation in transactional law. I taught Wills and Estates during my
first semester of law school teaching, which was when the dean
approached me regarding teaching Property. I was more than a little
frustrated that students lacked a basic understanding of some fundamental property law concepts, such as the difference between joint
tenancy and tenancy in common. I have since come to understand the

* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; B.A., Michigan State
University 1983; J.D., DePaul University College of Law 1988; LL.M., Georgetown University
Law Center 1992.
1. EDWARD H. RABIN & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN
REAL PROPERTY LAW (3d ed. 1992).
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difficulty of covering all fundamental property law concepts in a fourcredit course. In teaching property, however, I attempt to provide a
strong foundation so that students are as prepared as possible for
upper-level courses in Wills and Estates, Real Estate Transactions,
Real Estate Finance, Family Law, and Land Use Planning.
My early trepidation of teaching property has long since abated,
but I continue using the Rabin & Kwall casebook because it closely
matches my pedagogical method. This essay will explain why I use
the Rabin & Kwall casebook and how it conforms to my teaching
methodology. As will be explained in this essay, Professors Rabin and
Kwall's use of the problem method in conjunction with the reading and
analysis of case law, as well as their ordering and selection of the
material, is consistent with my approach to teaching Property Law.
My use of the casebook also enables me to teach Property Law from
a historical perspective by exploring the evolution of American
property law, its derivation from early English common law, its
modern reforms, and its future.2
Part II of this essay will outline my overall approach to teaching
Property and the inherent challenges of the subject. Part III sets out
the topics covered in my property classes and the relevance of the
"bundle of rights" concept. Part IV describes my use of the problem
method in teaching Property and counters the purported disadvantages
of applying that method. That part also demonstrates the practical use
of the problem approach. Part V examines the evolutionary nature of
property law and looks at three areas of law: landlord and tenant
relationships, the law of servitudes, and future interests.
II.

THE STUDY OF PROPERTY LAW

Most lay people believe the term "property" means a tangible or
intangible thing. The term, however, really denotes the various rights
appurtenant to the thing.3 My primary objective in teaching the first
session of my property course is to dispel any possible misinterpreta-

2. In the Teacher's Manual, Professors Rabin and Kwall state: "[t]he processes of doctrinal
genesis, evolution and development, and decay and fossilization are continuing even today. The
law, like most living organisms, carries within it vestigial structures that can best be understood
with the help of history." EDWARD H. RABIN & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, TEACHER'S
MANUAL TO FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 9-1 (3d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter TEACHER'S MANUAL].

3. Black's Law Dictionary defines "property" as "the unrestricted and exclusive right to a
thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude
every one else from interfering with it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990).
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tion students are likely to have about the meaning of property.'
Professors Rabin and Kwall's casebook is consistent with my methodology.
The casebook's Introduction is entitled, "The Right to Exclude
Others: The Essence of Ownership of Real Property."' The first case
in this chapter is Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.6
The Supreme Court in Loretto addressed the right of an owner to
exclude others from the owner's property in the context of a permanent
physical taking. In reaching its conclusion that there was a taking that
required just compensation, the Court characterized the right to
exclude as part of the "bundle of property rights."7 The Rabin and
Kwall casebook and its 1996 supplement also contain cases that do not
rise to the level of a per se "permanent" taking because the taking is
temporary. 8 In such cases, courts use a balancing of interests
approach. A comparison of the permanent physical takings cases with
the temporary takings cases gives me an early opportunity to explain
the theoretical differences between the per se rule and the balancing
approach.
Property is a difficult first year course. First, many of the key
cases in property law are early English common law cases and,
consequently, may be difficult for students to read at this stage in their
legal education. Second, in many areas there is the traditional
approach, the majority approach, the modern trend, and the Restatement approach. The modern trends may or may not be the majority
approach. From my perspective, the various approaches represent the
continuing evolution of property law. From the students' perspective,
it is often difficult to articulate the law because there is no uniform
standard. Finally, unlike other first year courses, most property law
concepts are foreign to the students. Students are unlikely to read
about property law fundamental concepts such as easements, covenants,
4. I usually begin the class by borrowing a student's wristwatch to use during class on the
pretense that mine is not working properly. I then explain that, at least during the class session,
the student and I each have a property interest in the single item of property. My rights, of
course, are limited to the right to use and possess the watch during class-the only rights
bestowed upon me. Although I have physical possession of the watch, I do not have unrestricted
rights to it.
5.

RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 1.

6. 458 U.S. 419 (1982), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL supra note 1, at 2.
7. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 6. Loretto is one of the seminal cases addressing
permanent physical takings.
8. See Yee v. City of Escondido, California, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), reprinted in EDWARD H.
RABIN & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF REAL PROPERTY LAW (3d ed.

Supp. 1996) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT]; State of New Jersey v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971),
reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 9.
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concurrent estates, springing executory interests, and restraints on
alienation in their local newspapers.
The one area that students have an understanding of, and quite
often direct experience with, is the law governing landlords and
Most
tenants-nonfreehold estates in property law vernacular.
students are, in fact, tenants, and they have signed leases. The
students may have even encountered legal issues pertaining to the
demised property. As a result, the students can relate to the law of
landlord and tenant unlike many other topics. Because most students
already have had some experience in the landlord and tenant area, it is
the first major substantive topic that I cover in my Property course.
It is also the first major topic addressed in the Rabin & Kwall
casebook. 9
III.

COVERAGE OF PROPERTY LAW CONCEPTS

There are 1088 pages of substantive material in the Rabin &
Kwall casebook. In addition, the supplement contains another 108
pages. At Marquette University Law School, Property is a required
first year, four-credit course. I am limited to covering approximately
500 pages. I prefer to cover fewer topics in critical detail rather than
more topics with less attention to detail. In my course, I generally
cover three broad topical subjects every semester: (1) nonfreehold
estates (the law of landlord and tenant); (2) freehold estates (future
interests and concurrent estates); and (3) servitudes (covenants and
I devote approximately two-and-one-half weeks to
easements).
landlord and tenant relationships. With minor modifications, I usually
9. In the Rabin & Kwall casebook, the landlord-tenant materials begin on page 26.
Although I usually alter the ordering of materials throughout the semester, I prefer to begin a
course by reading the first chapter in the casebook. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW (3d ed. 1994), is another casebook that
begins the study of property law with landlord and tenant relationships. In other casebooks,
landlord-tenant materials are found much later. For example, in CHARLES DONAHUE, JR. ET
AL., PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION (3d ed. 1993),

landlord and tenant materials begin on page 663; in JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER ET
AL., PROPERTY (4th ed. 1998), on page 415; in JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL,
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY:

A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998), on

page 582; in J. GORDON HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1998),
on page 415; in SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1998), on page 248; and in SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENO
KAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW (2d ed. 1993), on page 423; in
JOSEPH W. SINGER, RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, (2d ed. 1997), on page 761. There are

bona fide reasons why the law of landlord and tenant is covered later in the readings in the other
casebooks. A leasehold is an estate in land. By delaying the study of the law of landlord and
tenant, students using the other casebooks will already be exposed to the meaning of an estate.
However, I introduce the meaning of estates after my discussion of the "bundle of rights."
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cover all of the landlord and tenant materials. However, I do not cover
the chapter entitled "Landlord's Tort Liability for Personal Injuries" 1 because the students are exposed to the liability issues in their
substantive Torts class. I spend approximately four weeks on -the
nonconcurrent and concurrent estates, with the majority of the time
spent on future interests. I cover most of the materials on concurrent
estates. However, I only cover the introductory materials of the
chapter entitled "Marital Property"" because Marquette University
Law School has a separate Marital Property course. I devote approximately two-and-one-half weeks on the materials entitled "Covenants
Running with the Land (Promissory Servitudes)"' 2 and cover most of
the material under that subtitle.
In order to provide even a rudimentary understanding of the
future interest concepts, I must devote approximately three weeks to
the materials. I cover all of the future interest material except the
chapter entitled "Problems of Vesting."' 3 Although I did cover that
material during my last Property class, I do not plan to cover it again
because I believe it is more appropriately covered in the Wills and
Estates class. Many property law professors no longer cover future
interests and the Rule Against Perpetuities. 4 Although modern
reforms have essentially narrowed the significance of the Rule Against
Perpetuities (RAP), I teach future interests and RAP because they
establish the foundation for the law of trusts. My colleagues who teach
Wills and Estates do not cover the classification of estates and future
interests. Hence, if I choose not to cover future interests, it will not
be covered in any other course at my law school. In covering the
materials on future interests, I necessarily devote a lot of time to the
technical rules; however, I attempt also to use the materials as an
opportunity to expound on the "bundle of rights" concept. For
example, one of the rights inherent in property is an owner's right to
dispose of it. An individual who is not yet entitled to present
possession of a physical object may still be able to exercise the right to
dispose of it. On the other hand, the owner of certain present
possessory interests in property may be unable to sell the property. To

10. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 78.
11. Id. at 324.
12. Id. at 447.
13. Id. at 245.
14. A recent survey addressing topical coverage concluded that thirty-five percent of the
survey respondents (14 out of 40) did not cover future interests. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall and
Jerome M. Organ, The Contemporary Property Law Course: A Study of Syllabi, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 205, 208-09 (1997).
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provide a better understanding of this concept, I point out that in the
landlord and tenant context, the tenant has a present possessory
interest, but is not able to sell the property. The owner, however, is
legally authorized to dispose of the property even though the owner
does not have a present possessory interest in the property.
I also cover one other topic in detail, either real estate transactions
or regulatory takings, alternating between the two topics because of
time constraints. I like to cover real estate transactions primarily
because I teach the upper level Real Estate Finance and Development
course and I like my students to have some basic understanding of the
law of mortgages and acquisition of real estate. Students should
understand that a mortgagee owns a valuable property interest,
although that interest will become possessory only upon default and
initiation of a foreclosure proceeding. Whether or not I cover real
estate transactions, I always cover the materials entitled "Recording
Statutes."'" During the semester, the students learn that in order to
bind a successor in interest to an easement or a covenant, the successor
must have notice of the easement or covenant's existence. The editors
briefly explain in the material addressing the succession of easements
that a successor is considered to have notice where there exists actual,
constructive, or inquiry notice.16 A much more expansive discussion
of notice is provided in the "Recording Statutes" chapter, including
case law addressing the notice issue." Given the importance of the
notice requirement in the servitude area and other areas such as
adverse possession, I find it useful to devote the additional class time
to that material.
If I do not cover real estate transactions, I cover regulatory takings
during the last week of class; hence, there is a certain amount of
symmetry, as I begin the semester with physical takings and end with
regulatory takings. As noted by the editors in the "Introduction to
Regulatory Takings," there are many difficult issues that have not yet
been completely resolved by the courts.' 8 The editors included the
important Supreme Court decisions of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal

15.
16.

RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 953.
Id. at 401.

17. The editors included three cases emphasizing whether inquiry notice was present. See
Jefferson Cty. v. M.C. Mosley, 226 So. 2d 652 (Ala. 1969), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra
note 1, at 966; Martinique Realty Corp. v. Hull, 166 A.2d 803 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960),
reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 976; Sabo v. Horvath, 559 P.2d 1038 (Alaska
1976), reprintedin RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 988.
18. SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, at 41.
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Council,19 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2" Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 2 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.22 The
case that typically generates the most class discussion is the Supreme
Court's controversial decision in Lucas. That holding limited a
property owner's ability to recover just compensation because the
Court concluded that compensation was required only when a property
owner was deprived of "all economically productive or beneficial uses
of the land."2 3 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens disagreed in
part because of the "wholly arbitrary" aspect of the majority's
opinion." Specifically, Justice Stevens questioned the viability of a
rule where "[a] landowner whose property [was] diminished in value
95% recover[ed] nothing, while an owner whose property [was]
diminished 100% recover[ed] the land's full value."2s As one of the
fundamental rights inherent in property is the right to derive a profit
therefrom, should a person be able to recover just compensation where
profits are diminished by fifty percent, seventy-five percent, or even
ten percent? The editors also raise interesting issues such as what the
proper measure of damages would be.26
I usually cover two or three additional, less time-consuming
topics. Last semester I covered adverse possession and the law of
nuisance. The class sessions devoted to adverse possession usually
generate substantial class discussion. On the one hand, there is an
owner who possesses the "bundle of rights" inherent in the physical
property, including the right to use the land in any permissible manner
and, for most practical purposes, the right not to use the property. On
the other hand, there is another party who has exclusively possessed
the property for a number of years and served the public policy
objectives of productively using the land. The public policy concerns
commonly used to justify adverse possession were stated in ITT
Rayonier, Inc. v. Bell.27 The adverse possession doctrine is applied
to ensure "that title to land should not long be in doubt, that society
will benefit from someone's making use of land the owner leaves idle,
and that third persons who come to regard the occupant as owner may

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
743. ,

505 U.S. 1003 (1992), reprinted in SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, at 44.
260 U.S. 393 (1922), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 583.
438 U.S. 104 (1978), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 588.
512 U.S. 374 (1994), reprinted in SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, at 66.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992), reprinted in SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, at 53.
Id. at 62.
Id.
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, at 41.
112 Wash. 2d 754, 774 P.2d 6 (1989), reprintedin RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at
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be protected. '2' The editors raise some good discussion questions
regarding adverse possession. Why should a bona fide purchaser be
deprived of the property in favor of a nonpaying party?29 Should the
adverse possessor's right be forfeited unless the adverse possessor pays
the original owner the fair market value of the property?3" Where the
property is subject to a leasehold interest and an adverse possessor
occupies the land, is that possession adverse during the term of the
lease considering the landlord has relinquished possession to the
tenant? 31 Can a tenant acquire leased property through adverse
possession? 32 After much debate among the students, there is
generally little consensus reached on the proper treatment of these
issues.
In teaching the law of nuisance, I focus on the bundle of property
rights and the boundaries of these rights. To what extent may the
"bundle of rights" be limited to further a public or private interest?
With society becoming increasingly environmentally conscious, the law
of nuisance provides restrictions on a property owner's use of property.
The casebook's material on nuisance is limited to the "private"
nuisance, defined by the editors as "a wrongful interference with the
use or enjoyment of land of another. '33 This definition is inclusive
of far more than ecological concerns. For example, the definition
encompasses neighbors who wrongfully interfere with other neighbors'
use or enjoyment of land by playing their stereos too loud. The
editors included two cases that raise pollution concerns. 34 The editors
also included in the casebook Prah v. Maretti,35 which generates
substantial class discussion. In Prah, the plaintiff brought an action
against a neighbor on a theory of private nuisance to enjoin the
neighbor from obstructing the plaintiffs access to sunlight. The
plaintiff owned a solar-heated residence, and the defendant's proposed
construction would have interfered with plaintiffs access to sunlight.

28. Id. at 744 (citing William R. Stoebuck, Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WASH. L.
REV. 53 (1960)).
29. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 735.
30. Id. at 747.
31. Id. at 759.
32.

Id.

33. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 517.
34. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), reprintedin RABIN
& KWALL, supra note 1, at 522 (addressing whether dirt, smoke, and vibration from cement plant
created a nuisance); Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz.
1972), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 529 (addressing whether a cattle feedlot
creates a nuisance).
35. 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 537.
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The defendant's proposed construction conformed to deed restrictions
and local ordinances. The court noted that the case involved a conflict
between one landowner who desired "unobstructed access to sunlight
across adjoining property" and the adjoining landowner "interested in
the development of his land."36 Essentially, the question presented
in Prah, as well as in many other nuisance cases, is whose "bundle of
property rights" will take precedence. The court reversed the lower
court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant
and remanded the case for determination of whether there was an
unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs use of his property.37
IV.

A PROBLEM ANALYSIS APPROACH

In the preface, the editors state that "the law is not merely a body
of general principles: rather, it consists of applications of general
principles to specific facts."3 Their objective is to "put these theories
into practice by using a problem approach" in the casebook.39 This
approach mirrors my classroom methodology."°
In a recently
published article, Professor Cynthia G. Hawkins-Le6n compared the
Socratic method and problem method.41 She opined that three
components must be present in order for the problem method to be an
effective pedagogical tool: (1) the problem must be complex, include
several issues, and involve at least one case; (2) the problem must be
distributed prior to the class in which it is to be analyzed; and (3) the
problem must be the focus of class discussion.42 She also outlined
many of the disadvantages of using the problem method expressed by
several legal scholars. These disadvantages are:
(1) The professor must devote more time to course preparation in
order to draft problems and their answers....

36. Id.
37. Last year, we had an unexpected bonus in analyzing the Prah case. Because it was a
local case, one ambitious student looked up the litigants in the telephone book and drove to the
location to take an up-close look at the property (of course, from the public street). He learned
that the defendant was able to construct the residence in the desired location and, although the
neighbors' residences are very close in proximity, there continues to be social distance between
the neighbors.
38. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at v.
39. Id.
40. I generally apply the problem method approach in my Real Estate Finance &
Development and Federal Income Taxation of Individuals classes. I genuinely believe that
students learn better by applying the law to a set of facts.
41. Cynthia G. Hawkins-Le6n, The Socratic Method-Problem Method Dichotomy: The
Debate Over Teaching Method Continues, BYU EDUC. LAW J. 1 (1998).
42. Hawkins-Le6n, supra note 41, at 9.
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(2) The Problem Method is more costly than the Socratic Method
(3)

because its usage is most effective in smaller classes....
Professors are not as much at liberty to teach via lecture when

the Problem Method is utilized....
(4) Due to the in-depth discussion of individual problems, critics
fear that less course material is covered when the Problem

Method is utilized. 3

The Rabin and Kwall casebook satisfies the three key components
espoused by Professor Hawkins-Le6n, but counters the numerous
disadvantages. I agree with other legal scholars that a professor must
ordinarily devote a significant amount of time to the drafting of
problems and their answers. However, this is not an issue when using
the Rabin and Kwall casebook. Each major topic revolves around a
"principal problem." In addition, the Teacher's Manual contains
recommended analyses of the problems. Hence, there is no increased
preparation time in using the problem method.
The second purported disadvantage is that the problem method
is only useful in smaller classes. However, I believe the problem
method is a valuable approach even in a large class such as Property.
Many students have the misconception that the best way to learn is
through memorization. Although this may be true in other disciplines,
it is virtually impossible to memorize the law because of its sheer
magnitude. Memorization of case law does not adequately prepare a
student to analyze future fact patterns, whether presented during an
examination or in the practice of law, because these fact patterns will
not be an exact duplicate of the facts presented in a casebook.
Students need to be able to understand and apply that law to different
sets of facts. Whether there are 25 or 250 students in a class, every
student needs to be able to analyze and apply the law to the facts
presented in the problem.
The third purported disadvantage of the problem method, that
professors are not any less at liberty to lecture when using the problem
method than they would be when using the Socratic method, assumes
that in-depth analysis of problems necessarily supplants, rather than
supplements, lectures. The substantive black letter law must still be
made known to students. Customarily, in my Property classes, I
devote at least fifty percent of class time to lecturing on the substantive
43. Hawkins-Le6n, supra note 41, at 9-10 (citing Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case
Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241, 245 (1992); Gregory L.
Ogden, The Problem Method In Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 654, 664 (1984); and
Suzanne Kurtz et al., Problem-Based Learning: An Alternative Approach to Legal Education, 13
DALHOUSIE L.J. 797, 802 (1990)).
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law. Consequently, class lecture is complemented rather than replaced
by the problem method.
As to the fourth purported disadvantage, my philosophy is to
cover fewer topics in greater detail rather than to cover more topics in
less detail. So, for my teaching style the concern about constricting
topic coverage does not apply. If I ever decide to alter my decision to
use the problem method, I do not believe I will cover any additional
topics.
The principal problems presented in the casebook supplement the
legal concepts raised in the cases and editors' notes. They provide the
students with an opportunity to analyze complex legal issues in the
context of practical problems. One of the first principal problems
presented in the casebook deals with a first-year law student who
arrives in town to begin her legal career only to find her apartment
occupied by someone else.44 Clearly, every law student is able to
relate to the sheer panic a first-year student, already feeling insecure
about law school, would experience upon arriving in town with no
place to live! The editors also included other landlord and tenant
problems in the casebook that raise challenging issues. What happens
when a sublessee has made rental payments to the sublessor who "has
left for parts unknown" without remitting any of the sublessee's
payments to the lessor?4" Can a landlord withhold consent to an
assignment or sublease on the basis that, while the prospective assignee
or sublessee has an excellent credit rating, he "has a long beard, long
hair, and in general projects a somewhat unconventional image?" 46
Is a clause in a lease precluding assignments or subleases enforceable,
or is that an unenforceable restraint on alienation? 47 These types of
practical issues are presented throughout the casebook.
The principal problems also present weaknesses in the current law
and raise the necessity for continued reform. For example, under
present law there is no horizontal privity between neighbors; hence, the
neighbor in the problem would be unable to recover damages because
the action is one at law. In the "Running of the Burden" chapter, the
editors included a problem where a successor sought to enforce two
covenants against a neighbor-one which ran in equity and the other
at law.48 The problem shows the seeming ludicrousness of the
horizontal privity requirement, as the neighbor would be successful at
44. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 35.
45. Id. at 136.
46. Id. at 146.
47. Id.
48. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 487.
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obtaining injunctive relief but not damages. The neighbor could
successfully pursue injunctive relief, but could not collect damages
because the relationship of neighboring landowners did not satisfy the
horizontal privity requirement.
V.

THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF PROPERTY LAW

The editors state in the preface that property law "oozes with
tradition" for the traditionalist, "cries out for reform" for the reformer,
and "embodies the often unexpressed assumptions on which our
society rests."49 Because these unexpressed assumptions change as
society changes, the law of property is a work in progress. I do not
believe that a law student can sufficiently understand the present law
governing property interests without understanding the prior law. The
metamorphic changes that have taken place in the law of property are
just as significant as the black letter law of today. Without an
understanding of why the law is evolving, the student is lost in the
myriad of rules and left with the hopeless task of trying to memorize
those rules. The rules governing landlord and tenant relationships,
servitudes, and future interests have gone through a metamorphosis."0
The Rabin & Kwall casebook contains traditional approaches, modern
trends and glimpses of possible future reforms in each of these areas.
A. The Law of Landlord and Tenant
The doctrine of caveat emptor dictated the traditional approach to
landlord and tenant relationships. The lease was considered a
conveyance of an interest in land, and the landlord's only obligation
was to deliver possession. Professors Rabin and Kwall use Marini v.
Ireland5 1 to summarize the traditional approach and the justification
for its erosion and to explain the standard used today in most
residential leases: the implied warranty of habitability. The wellknown reasons for the creation of the warranty include the unfair
bargaining power between the landlord and tenant and the limited
available housing for low income tenants.52 The editors raise a good
discussion question about whether the warranty is actually beneficial

49. Id. at vi.
50. Other areas in property law continue to evolve as well. However, I limit my discussion
to landlord and tenant relationships, future interests, and servitudes.
51. 265 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1970), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 53.
52. The editors use Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268 (Cal. 1981), reprinted in RABIN
& KWALL, supra note 1, at 56, to provide a good discussion on the policy reasons for implying
the warranty.
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or harmful to the tenants it intends to protect.5 3 This question
usually generates considerable debate from the students.
The editors included Davidow v. Inwood North Professional Group
- Phase I" in the materials to illustrate the implied warranty of
habitability's use in the commercial setting, but the notes in the
casebook correctly point out that the implied warranty of habitability
has not yet been widely adopted in the commercial setting.5 5 I
generally like to ask the class whether there is any reason to distinguish
the residential and commercial leases, especially where the commercial
tenant is a small business-for example, a mom and pop neighborhood
store-with limited business sophistication and limited resources.
My methodology in teaching landlord and tenant law is to
expound on the "bundle of rights" principle and how its continuing
changes affect the property owner's use of the property. A property
owner has the right to derive profits from property, but can that owner
decide to exercise discriminatory practices in renting property to
tenants? Can a landlord decide to retaliate against a tenant who has
complained about a housing code violation by evicting that tenant?
The editors point out that under common law, landlords could be
"bigoted or unreasonable" in selecting or rejecting tenants, and the
landlords could refuse to renew a lease for arbitrary reasons.5 6 After
a brief introduction to the retaliatory eviction rules, the chapter is
devoted to the Fair Housing Act's prohibition of discrimination in
8
rental practices.5 7 The case of Kramarsky v. Stahl Management"
provides a good opportunity for me to explain the parameters of the
Fair Housing Act. The court points out that it is acceptable to
discriminate arbitrarily against a prospective tenant as long as the
discrimination is not a violation of the Fair Housing Act. Interestingly, the discrimination in Kramarsky was based on the prospective
tenant's status as an attorney. 59
The following chapter in the casebook focuses on the rights of a
tenant to assign or to sublease. Once again, the material illustrates
how the law regarding the landlord and tenant relationship continues

53.

RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 77.

54. 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 68.
55. RABIN & KWALL, supranote 1, at 52. The editors provide some insight into the future
use of the implied warranty of habitability in the commercial setting by stating: "[tihere is some
movement in the direction of implying a similar warranty of fitness with respect to nonresidential

leased premises, but this development is still tentative and uncertain." Id.
56. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 115.
57.

See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).

58. 401 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1977), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1,at 116.
59. Id.
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to be a work in progress. The editors point out that traditionally a
landlord could arbitrarily withhold consent to an assignment or
sublease.6" That approach in the majority of courts has been succeed-6
ed by a requirement that consent must not be arbitrarily withheld. '
In discussing this material, I remind the students of the "bundle of
rights" inherent in property law. I usually ask the class whether they
can reconcile the landlord's bundle of rights with the landlord's
inability to withhold consent arbitrarily and his subjection to restrictions in selecting and removing tenants. The editors use Newman v.
Hinky Dinky Omaha-Lincoln, Inc. 62 to demonstrate a court's adoption
of the rule prohibiting unreasonable withholding of consent. The
Hinky Dinky case articulates factors to be analyzed in reaching the
determination of whether the landlord had arbitrarily withheld consent.
B.

The Law of Servitudes: Covenants and Easements

The editors have written well-developed introductory materials on
the law of servitudes.63 They provide a brief discussion of the
proposed merger of servitudes under one body of rules. 64 They also
point out that the law of easements has been relatively stable, whereas
the law of covenants is governed by evolving rules. 6' The materials
in the casebook, however, leave me some latitude in covering the law
of easements as a work in progress. Traditionally, an owner of
property was unable to reserve newly created easements in favor of a
third party who was not a party to the conveyance. The editors
included Estate of Thomson66 in the casebook, which illustrates some
courts' reluctance to abandon the long-standing traditional approach.
The editors also included Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist,
Pacifica,6 7 where the court adopted the minority approach, the
modern trend, because the traditional approach was "clearly an
inapposite feudal shackle. ' 68 The contrasting approaches taken by the
Thomson and Willard courts provide an interesting class discussion on
the issue of whether there is any bona fide reason in modern times to

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 145.

Id.
427 N.W.2d 50 (Neb. 1988), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 146.
RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 357-61.
Id. at 358.
Id.
509 N.E.2d 309 (N.Y. 1987), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1,at 375.
498 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1972), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 372.
Id.
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prevent a conveyor from creating an interest in a person who is not a
party to the conveyance.
The casebook provides additional opportunities to explore the
changing doctrine of the law of easements." However, I only briefly
discuss these matters in order to devote substantial time to the more
challenging and evolving law of covenants. In my introduction to the
law of covenants, I usually lecture on the requirements for the running
of the benefits and burdens in law and equity because of the topic's
complexity. In their introduction to the law of covenants, the editors
explain that the law of covenants "is an unspeakable quagmire."7
They also explain the difference between covenants that run at law and
those that run at equity.71 The American Law Institute has proposed
and adopted many revisions to the law governing covenants. The
editors allude to many of these revisions and provide insight into the
Restatement modifications and the future direction of the law of
covenants.7 2
There are several rules governing covenants that have purely
historical significance. The disparate treatment in enforcing covenants
at law and in equity was created at a time when the courts of law and
equity were separate. The editors included in the casebook the early
English case of Tulk v. Moxhay,73 which allowed a covenant to be
enforced in equity, even though it could not be enforced at law. The
Tulk case is commonly considered to have created the equitable

69. For example, the editors point out that the traditional rule that easements in gross could
not be transferred, but the modern trend is to allow for such transfer absent contrary intent of the
grantor. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 378.
70. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 447. They also state:
The intrepid soul who ventures into this formidable wilderness never emerges unscarred.
Some, the smarter ones, quickly turn back to take up something easier, like astrophysics.
Others, having lost their way, plunge on and after weeks of effort emerge not far from
where they began, clearly the worse for wear. On looking back they see the trail they
thought they broke obscured with foul smelling waters and noxious weeds. Few
willingly take up the challenge again.
Id.
71. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 449-50. In order for a party to successfully bring
an action for damages (at law) against a successor in interest for violation of a covenant, there
must exist intent, touch and concern, vertical privity, horizontal privity, and notice. In order for
a party to obtain injunctive relief against a successor in interest, that party need only establish
intent, notice, and touch and concern.
72. See for example, RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 447, where the editors state that
the Restatement sections are currently being rewritten, hopefully to "meet with a kinder, gentler
reception than did their predecessors," and RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 483, where they
discuss the Restatement's abandonment of the touch and concern requirement.
73. 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note
1, at 489.
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servitude. As noted in the casebook, today the courts of law and
equity have merged in most jurisdictions; consequently, the editors
raise the question of whether there is any modern justification for
disparate treatment.74
The editors also raise the question of whether there is any modern
justification for requiring horizontal privity for a covenant to run at law
in light of its disapproval by legal scholars and its rejection by the
Restatement. 75
The editors included Moseley v. Bishop76 for its
discussion of the horizontal privity requirement. In my lecture, I use
the Moseley case to discuss the three types of relationships sufficient to
establish horizontal privity, but also to question the worth of such a
requirement in modern times. In a footnote, the court in Moseley
discounts the "continuing vitality" of the horizontal privity requirement based on several policy reasons.7 7
I usually conclude the discussion of servitudes by reminding the
class of the bundle of rights inherent in the ownership of property and
raising policy issues. For example, one of the rights inherent in
property ownership is the right to control the use of the property.
Why should this use be restricted by an agreement that the owner's
predecessor in interest entered into with another party, especially if the
current owner did not have actual notice of the agreement? Are the
complex set of rules governing the law of covenants essential to balance
the competing interests of protecting the property owner's rights to use
and a party's benefits derived from a freely negotiated contract?
Whose bundle of rights should take precedence-the owner of the
underlying property or the owner of the benefits of a covenant?
C.

Future Interests and the Rule Against Perpetuities

One of the most challenging areas in the study of property law is
the rule against perpetuities. Traditionally, the common law rule
against perpetuities provided: "No interest is good unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest. '"78 In order to develop even a basic understanding of perpetuities issues, students must be able to classify an
interest because the rule applies only to contingent remainders, vested

74.
75.
76.

RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 492.

Id. at 485.
470 N.E.2d 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at

492.
77. Id. at 495-96.
78. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942),
reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 196.
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remainders subject to open, and executory interests. The casebook
devotes a separate chapter 79 to the terminology associated with future
interests."0 The terminology is explained by way of forty-three
examples. 8 These examples help the student establish a critical
foundation to understanding future interests.
As with many concepts in property law, the Rule Against
Perpetuities had its origins in English law. It is an area that has gone
through evolutionary modifications. One fundamental question that
I asked myself prior to teaching property law was whether it was
pedagogically sound for me to teach the Rule Against Perpetuities
given the time commitment required for covering the materials.
Although I graduated from law school without a clear understanding
of the rule and did not encounter a perpetuity question prior to
entering academia, I answered my question in the affirmative. I
thought it was worthwhile for students to explore the issue of whether
a property owner's bundle of rights should include the ability to
control the property in perpetuity even after the property owner's
death.
The traditional Rule Against Perpetuities was designed to
promote the full utilization of land and the free exchange and control
of property at the discretion of the present owner rather than a
deceased transferor. In application, the Rule Against Perpetuities
thwarts a testator or grantor's intent to dispose of assets in the way he
or she sees fit. With these competing interests in mind, a valid
question is whether there are any other approaches that might satisfy
both interests.
The book references two well-known modern reforms that are
applied to alleviate the harshness of the Rule Against Perpetuities: the
doctrines of cy pres and "wait and see." The editors included Fleet

79. The chapter also includes a brief, informative discussion of the English historical origins
of freehold estates. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 174-77. The brevity of the early English
common law is also consistent with my teaching methodology. I believe that students should have
some exposure to the early English law; however, as noted by the editors in the Teacher's
Manual, "students do not appreciate being bogged down in a myriad of historical data."
TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 2, at 9-1. The Teacher's Manual contains a detailed description
of the English historical background relating to freehold estates and a chronological outline of
important dates. TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 2, at 9-1 - 9-23. I incorporate some of these
helpful historical facts into my lecture to give the students some foundation, but I prefer to focus
on the historical development within this country.
80. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 174-91.
81. I believe the only way to learn to classify interests properly is through repetition. To
supplement the casebook materials, I recommend that students read CHARLES I. NELSON &
PETER T. WENDEL, A POSSESSORY ESTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS PRIMER (1996). It
contains problem sets and additional examples that students find useful.
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National Bank v. Colt s2 to illustrate the wait and see doctrine. The
court in Fleet National Bank adopted an approach that allows for an
examination of the "wait-and-see actualities," as opposed to the
"orthodox possibilities." 3 I pose the question to the class whether
the modern reform is superior to the traditional Rule Against
Perpetuities, or whether the reform creates a new set of problems. The
editors address many shortcomings of the wait and see doctrine at the
end of the chapter.8 4
The editors included In re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop 5 to
illustrate a court's adoption of the cy pres doctrine. In the Estate of
Chun, the court stated that "[t]he genius of the common law, upon
86
which our jurisprudence is based, is its capacity for orderly growth.
This quotation, although applicable in other subjects, gives credence
to my objective of presenting property law as a work in progress,
constantly being reformed and fine-tuned to address the modern times.
Another area that continues to evolve is the relationship between
the Rule Against Perpetuities and restraints on alienation. Included in
the bundle of property rights is the owner's right freely to transfer the
property. The editors explore this issue by examining preemptive
rights-the rights of first refusal. Assuming a preemptive right does
not result in an impermissible restraint on alienation, should the right
still be subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities? Are the policy
justifications of both concepts distinct enough to warrant independent
application? The editors included the cases of Shiver v. Benton 7 and
Ferrero Construction Co. v. Dennis Rouke Corp."8 that directly deal
with these issues.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Rabin and Kwall casebook allows me to adhere to my
teaching methodology and meet my pedagogical objectives. The
principal cases provide the students with a good snapshot of the law of
property and its evolution. The use of the principal problems strongly
complements my commitment to the problem analysis approach. One
weakness of using this approach is that the first-year students still
believe there is a "correct" answer. They usually feel unsure as to

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

529 A.2d 122 (R.I. 1987), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 213.
RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 217.
Id. at 225-27.
469 P.2d 183 (Haw. 1970), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 220.
Id. at 221.
304 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1983), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 267.
536 A.2d 1137 (Md. 1988), reprinted in RABIN & KWALL, supra note 1, at 270.
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what is the correct answer because cases included in the casebook are
indicative of the evolving nature of property law and do not represent
a uniform standard.
The major disadvantage in using the casebook is that it was
published in 1992 and has a 1996 supplement. Generally, I would
prefer not to use casebook supplements, although I understand their
necessity. Because I present Property as a work in progress, a more
recent edition would better serve my objectives. All in all, I enjoy
using the casebook. It provides the students not only with an
opportunity to learn about significant issues in property law and the
evolutionary nature of the subject, but also provides them with an
opportunity to gain practical experience in applying legal theory to
facts.

